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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
David

J.

Whitecotton appeals from the judgment of the

the jury verdict ﬁnding

him

Whitecotton argues the

district court erred

abused

discretion

its

Statement

Of The

Robercha

Facts

Ms.

when

to his chest

started asking about

behaving strangely

in front

maps.

denied his motion to suppress and

it

was picking up her
(Id.)

Brillhart

and kept turning

and Mr. Roberts continued

thought this behavior was odd and suspicious.

1

American

himself.

to his side,

(Id.)

prescription, this

(E

id.)

which had the

the store

The man
effect

of

The man remained standing
Ms.

Brillhart

unknown man with

the gun,

their conversation.

(Id.)

(Id.)

After Ms. Brillhart reported the odd behavior of the

the

(R., pp. 13-22;1

The man then entered

them and introduced

exposing his handgun to Ms. Brillhart and her brother.

Ms.

pharmacy.

Then, as Ms. Brillhart was standing outside talking

t0

his chest

was an unknown man with a

at the local

0f the pharmacy.

(Id.)

man walked up

was wearing a handgun on

there as

appeal,

sentenced him to ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed.

Brillhart reported that While she

t0 her brother, the

On

upon

And Course Of The Proceedings

unknown man was pacing
and

it

entered

Unlawful Possession 0f a Firearm.

Brillhart reported to the police that there

handgun strapped
91-99.)

When

guilty of

district court

Falls police department dispatched

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez.

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer

There appear t0 be several copies of the record in the case. However it appears that
is using the record labeled “David Whitecotton Appeal-Final.pdf.”
Unless

Appellant

otherwise noted, Respondent will use the same record.
1

man matching Ms.

Rodriquez made contact with the

man was

(E

id.;

ﬂ

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

man

but the

started

211$ EX.

man was

(Id.)

driving status

was revoked due

could not be driving.

else.

about the report 0f suspicious behavior,

leaving.

2

The

The card identiﬁed

(ﬂ

id.)

The man

and instead provided a

the

man

as Whitecotton. (Id.)

t0 his vehicle t0 run the record check.

t0 a felony

(Id.)

to

DUI in 2014.

(m R., pp.

13-

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez then got

Whitecotton that due to his revoked driving status he

Whitecotton said he could

make them

call a

cab or get a ride from

the

gun because

it

(E R., pp.,

80-91, 96, n

made people

citations are to this ﬁle

at

the

gun could scare

11:30 to 15:30.) Whitecotton

“less likely to

commit crime.”

(Id.)

0f a recording of Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s body

EX. C.) The relevant electronic ﬁle contained in
AXON_FleX_Video_2016-08-01_1624.mp4. Time

.1;

that exhibit for this appeal is labeled

how wearing

(E EX. C

feel uncomfortable.

parties stipulated to the admission

camera.

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

(Id.)

was carrying

said he

id.)

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez asked for the man’s driver’s

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez and Whitecotton discussed
people and

(E

EX. C. at 6:00 to 15:30.) The record check showed that Whitecotton’s

back out of his car and explained

someone

man

reluctant to provide his driver’s license,

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez returned

ﬂ alﬂ

The

0:30 to 6:00.)

t0 turn off the truck so they could talk.

veteran’s identiﬁcation card. (Id.)

22, 91-99;

at

started t0 ask the

eventually turned off the truck.

license, but the

C2

up the truck and said he was

man

then instructed the

(Id.)

parked truck and Ofﬁcer Rodriguez could see the handgun strapped

sitting in a

t0 his chest.

Brillhart’s description.

and are approximate.
2

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez explained
could arrest him

now

that

because Whitecotton’s driver’s license was revoked he

for driving to the store, but

he did not want to do

Rodriguez cautioned Whitecotton not t0 drive 0n a revoked
hands.

license.

that.

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer

(Id.)

They shook

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez returned

to his patrol car.

(E R., pp.

13-21; 92-93.) Ofﬁcer

Rodriguez then saw Whitecotton drive his truck out of the parking

spot.

Ofﬁcer

(Id.)

Rodriguez pulled out and started t0 follow Whitecotton when Whitecotton parked in
another parking spot.

(Id.)

Dispatch informed Ofﬁcer Rodriguez that Whitecotton had additional felony
convictions.

(Id.)

Due

possession of a ﬁrearm.
his ﬁrearm.

t0 his felony convictions, Whitecotton could not legally

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez then requested Whitecotton turn over

Whitecotton reﬁlsed and drove away.

(Id.)

chase and then stopped Whitecotton and arrested him.

The

state

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez gave

(Id.)

(Id.)

charged Whitecotton with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm.

50-51, 136-137.)

made

(R., pp. 65-66.)

The

state

responded.

Video attached t0 the afﬁdavit 0f Anson L. Call

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress[.]”

The

(R., p. 92, n. 1;

Memorandum Decision and

district court

found that the

“all

as a result 0f an illegal trafﬁc stop without

(R., pp. 70-87.)

stipulated t0 the admission 0f the “Police Report, Witness Statement,

court issued a

(R., pp.

Whitecotton ﬁled a Motion t0 Suppress seeking t0 suppress

evidence obtained and statements
probable cause[.]”

be in

II,

in

The

parties

and Body

Cam

Support of Opposition to

ﬂ alﬂ

pp. 76-87.)

The

district

Order. (R., pp. 91-99.)

initial

encounter between Ofﬁcer Rodriguez and

Whitecotton was consensual; however, once Ofﬁcer Rodriguez instructed Whitecotton to

turn off his truck, the encounter

(R.,

pp.

The

93-95.)

district

was n0 longer consensual and Whitecotton was

court next analyzed whether Ofﬁcer Rodriguez had

reasonable articulable suspicion t0 conduct this investigatory stop.
court found that

district

Ms.

seized.

Brillhart,

the reporting party,

(R., pp. 95-98.)

was known

The

Ofﬁcer

to

Rodriguez and thus Ofﬁcer Rodriguez was justiﬁed in acting upon the information of a
suspicious and armed individual that

was provided by Ms.

(E

Brillhart.

id.)

In this case, the reporting party was known t0 Ofﬁcer Rodriguez.
She was reporting that an armed man was acting suspiciously outside the
Rockland Pharmacy. Her report was subj ect t0 immediate conﬁrmation by

law enforcement, and if she made a willfully false report, she would have
been subject to prosecution under Idaho Code § 18-705. Based 0n those

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez was justiﬁed

fact,

in relying

as a basis for the investigative stop.

[143], 146,

See

upon Ms.

Adams

Brillhart’s report

Williams],

[v.

A brief stop

92 S.Ct. [1921], 1923 [(1972)].

407 U.S.

of a suspicious

individual in order to determine his identity 0r t0 maintain the status quo

momentarily while obtaining more information
of the facts

light

known

may be most

to the ofﬁcer at the time.

Id.

reasonable in

In addition, the

information provided by Ms. Brillhart carried a particular indication of
it was based upon her own ﬁrst-hand observation of the

reliability in that

reported

events.

Her report was

Rodriguez’s observation 0f a

man

further

sitting in

corroborated

by Ofﬁcer

a black Ford pick-up truck

with Oregon plates and ﬁtting the description provided by [Ms.] Brillhart.
(R., p. 98.)

The

district court

denied Whitecotton’s motion to suppress.

(Id.)

Whitecotton pled guilty t0 unlawﬁll possession 0f a ﬁrearm and the
dismiss the misdemeanors. (2/10/17 TL, p. 18, L. 5
sentencing hearing, Whitecotton absconded.

arrested.

— p.

37, L. 16.)

(E R., pp.

state

agreed t0

However, prior

114-121.) Whitecotton

t0 the

was

re-

(I_d.)

After his re-arrest,

Whitecotton

moved

t0

at

the

time scheduled for his

withdraw his guilty

plea.

new

sentencing hearing,

(8/30/17 Tr., p. 2, L. 3

—

p. 9, L. 9.)

The

district court

granted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and set the case for jury

trial.

(Id.)

The jury found Whitecotton
171; 12/5/17 TL, p. 201, L. 18

—

guilty 0f unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm.

p.

At sentencing, the

204, L. 17.)

state

(R., p.

requested a

sentence of ﬁve years with four years ﬁxed, in part because Whitecotton had absconded

from probation
hearing.

in

Oregon and Whitecotton

(12/15/17 Tr., p. 21

(12/15/17 Tr., p. 214, L. 3

—

—

1,

L. 8

p.

218, L.

p.

failed t0 appear at

an

earlier sentencing

213, L. 23.) Whitecotton argued for probation.

The

3.)

district court

reviewed the presentence

investigation report and considered the facts and circumstances of the case as well as

considering Whitecotton’s prior criminal record. (12/15/17 Tr., p. 224, L. 20

7.)

The

district court

noted that

(12/15/17 Tr., p. 224, L. 20

—

p.

this

was not Whitecotton’s

227, L.

7.)

The

Whitecotton
pp. 208-212.)

4/27/18 TL, p.

leniency.

180—182.)

The

moved

—

entered judgment and

ﬂ alﬂ

R., pp. 177-179.)

for reduction of sentence under Idaho Criminal

district court

5, L. 5

(Id.;

held a hearing 0n the Rule 35 motion.

p. 16, L. 21.)

(4/27/18 Tr., p. 14, L. 8

—

The

district court

p. 16, L. 18.)

227, L.

ﬁrst felony conviction.

district court

sentenced Whitecotton to ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed.

— p.

Rule 35.

(R.,

(R., p. 217;

denied the Rule 35 motion for

Whitecotton timely appealed.

(R., pp.

ISSUES
Whitecotton

states the issues

Whether the

I.

motion

on appeal

as:

district court erred

to suppress because

it

When

it

denied Mr. Whitecotton’s

failed t0 conduct the requisite analysis,

because under the proper analysis, the contents of Ms.
did not obj ectively demonstrate he was, or
sort

II.

fact

was about

and

Brillhart’s report

t0 be,

engaged in any

of criminal conduct.

Whether the
that

district court

sentence, as evidenced
the case

abused

its

by considering the
it imposed his
“Certainly had to look at

discretion

Mr. Whitecotton exercised his rights when

much

by

differently

its

explanation that

it,

once he withdrew that plea and required the

State to prove his guilt to a jury.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Whitecotton failed to show the district court erred when it determined,
based upon Ms. Brillhart’s report, that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez had reasonable articulable
1.

suspicion to temporarily detain Whitecotton for investigation?

2.

When

it

Has Whitecotton

sentenced Whitecotton?

failed t0

show

the district court abused

its

discretion

ARGUMENT
I.

The

Court Correctly Denied Whitecotton’s Motion To Suppress Because Ofﬁcer

District

Rodriguez

Had Reasonable

Suspicion

Of Potential

Criminal Conduct To Check

Whitecotton’ s Identiﬁcation

A.

Introduction

The
report of an

district court

found that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez could rely upon Ms. Brillhart’s

unknown man, with

a gun strapped to his chest, acting strangely at the local

pharmacy, in order to temporarily detain Whitecotton to investigate.

On

(E R., pp. 91-99.)

appeal, Whitecotton argues the district court applied the incorrect analysis because the

district court

was required

to identify a speciﬁc

(E Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-16.)
ﬁnd he had

or

was about

Whitecotton’s argument
State V. Perez-Jungo,

t0

is

crime based upon Ms. Brillhart’s report.

Whitecotton then argues there were insufﬁcient facts t0

commit a

theft or criminal exhibition

of a ﬁrearm.

(E

contrary to Idaho law and has been previously rejected.

156 Idaho 609, 329 P.3d 391

(Ct.

App. 2014).

id.)

E

Reasonable

suspicion does not require a belief that a speciﬁc crime has been 0r

is

EQ

by Whitecotton d0 not

In addition t0 being contrary to Idaho law, the cases cited

about to committed.

support his conclusion that the district court erred. The district court properly found that,

based upon Ms.

Brillhart’s

report

and Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s observations, Ofﬁcer

Rodriguez could conduct a brief stop to determine Whitecotton’s identity and obtain
additional information.

court erred.

(E R., pp.

97-98.) Whitecotton has failed to

show

the district

Standard

B.

The

the

trial

Idaho

appellate court reviews the denial of a

State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607,

standard.

w,

Of Review
motion

389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016)

(citing

147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The appellate court Will accept
court’s ﬁndings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Li. (citing

at

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

However

w,

m,

147 Idaho

The

at

District

Report

Of

147

the appellate court freely reviews the trial

court’s application 0f constitutional principles in light of the facts found.

C.

W

t0 suppress using a bifurcated

Li. (citing

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

Upon The
Of Some Potential

Court Did Not Err Because Ofﬁcer Rodriguez, Based

A Known

Informant,

Had Reasonable

Suspicion

Criminal Activity

The

district court

when Ofﬁcer Rodriguez
district court

found that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez temporarily seized Whitecotton

told Whitecotton t0 turn off his truck.

found that Ms.

the details of that report

—

Brillhart’s report t0

that

(E R., pp. 94-98.)

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez was

reliable,

and

The
that

Whitecotton was armed and acting odd and suspiciously —

provided reasonable articulable suspicion for Ofﬁcer Rodriguez t0 detain Whitecotton in
order to

investigate

the

situation

and Whitecotton’s identiﬁcation.

(Id.)

Using

Whitecotton’s identiﬁcation, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez was able t0 determine the Whitecotton

was a convicted
The

felon

district court

who

could not legally possess ﬁrearms.

(E R., pp.

13-22, 91-99.)

did not err and properly applied the reasonable suspicion standards t0

determine that the detention in order t0 obtain Whitecotton’s identiﬁcation did not Violate
the Fourth

Amendment 0f the United

States Constitution.

Pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment 0f the United

0f the people to be secure in

their

States Constitution “[t]he right

persons, houses, papers,

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
police ofﬁcer

may

behavior “if there

State V. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76,

it is

detained person

m,
392 U.s.

is,

has been, 0r

is

about to

996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000) (quoting
“is

m

about t0 be engaged in criminal activity.”

v.

(Ct.

App. 2003)

Cortez, 449 U.s. 41

“Investigatory detentions are permissible

1,

Idaho

_, 429 P.3d 877, 883

(citing Ter_ry V. Ohio,

417 (1981)).

when justiﬁed by an

articulable suspicion that a person has committed, 0r is about to

_

A

based upon speciﬁc articulable facts which justify suspicion that the

21 (1968); United States

V. Fairchild,

is

829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992)). Such a detention

139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223

1,

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

an articulable suspicion that the person has committed 0r

State V. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932,

permissible if

against

effects,

detain a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal

is

commit a crime.”

and

(Ct.

App. 2018)

ofﬁcer’s reasonable

commit, a crime.”
(citing State V.

m

Morgan,

154 Idaho 109, 112, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2013)). “‘Reasonable suspicion must be based

on speciﬁc,
facts.

articulable facts

Reasonable

suspicion

and the rational inferences
requires

that

can be drawn from those

more than a mere hunch or inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion.” Ld- (Quoting

m,

154 Idaho

at 112,

294 P.3d

“The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the
circumstances at the time of the stop.”

988 P.2d 700, 709

(Ct.

Li

totality

less than

cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the ofﬁcer.”

988 P.2d

at 709).

of the

(citing State V. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483,

App. 1999)). Reasonable suspicion “requires

Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483,

at 1124).

“An ofﬁcer may draw

probable

Li. (citing

reasonable inferences

from the

and those inferences

facts in his or her possession,

ofﬁcer’s experience and law enforcement training.”

may be drawn from

Li. (citing State V.

the

Montague, 114

Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988)). “‘A determination that reasonable
suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”’

(quoting United States V. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).

reasonable suspicion ‘must be based 0n

human behavior.”
(citing Illinois V.

“An

210 P.3d 578

may

informant’s tip regarding suspected criminal activity

was

When

it

appropriate.”’

(citing

“Whether a

circumstances

(Ct.

App. 2009)

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).

1210-1211 (2009)
at 22.)

“The assessment of

sense judgments and inferences about

State V. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470,

reasonable suspicion

that a stop

common

tip

provided.” Li. (citing

State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 81 1-812,

Alabama

the

m,

give rise t0

would ‘Warrant a man 0f reasonable caution

amounts

including

V.

White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990);

to reasonable suspicion

substance,

496 U.S.

at

source,

and

reliability

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).

“The more

Ter_ry,

Li

392 U.S.

totality

of the

328-329.) “In other words, a

in the belief

203 P.3d 1203,

depends 0n the

adequate indicia of reliability in order to justify a Terry stop.”

tip

information

must possess

(citing

Adams

m,

496 U.S.

at 330.)

basis of his or her knowledge, whether the location of the informant

was based on ﬁrst-hand observations of events

whether the information the informant provided was subj ect

by

police,

whether the

informant has

10

V.

“Factors

indicative 0f reliability include Whether the informant reveals his 0r her identity

corroboration

of the

reliable the tip, the less information

required to establish reasonable suspicion.” Li. (citing

the information

Li

to

is

as they

and the

known, whether
were occurring,

immediate conﬁrmation or

previously provided

reliable

information, Whether the informant provides predictive information, and Whether the

informant could be held criminally liable

if the report

were discovered

to

be

false.”

Li.

(citations omitted.)

Whitecotton ﬁrst argues that the
Brillhart’s report could

be relied upon and did not “evaluate whether the

Brillhart’s report objectively

t0

was required

facts in

Ms.
Ms.

demonstrated that Mr. Whitecotton was, or was about t0 be,

engaged in criminal conduct.” (Appellant’s
district court

court only evaluated Whether

district

brief, pp. 7-1 1.)

t0 speciﬁcally identify

have committed or have been about

t0

Whitecotton argues that the

what crime Whitecotton was supposed

(E

commit.

id.)

Whitecotton then goes 0n t0

argue that there were insufﬁcient facts to support reasonable suspicion 0f a “theft-type
offense” or an “exhibition 0f a ﬁrearm” type offense.

Whitecotton’s argument

10W standard required
speciﬁc crime.

is

and

incorrect

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.

Rather, reasonable suspicion

Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 615, 329 P.3d
In

Perez-Jungo,

Whitecotton

now

relatively

for “reasonable suspicion” does not require the police t0 identify a

is

established if the facts

ofﬁcer tend objectively to show that some crime has been or

m

The

contrary t0 Idaho law.

is

12-16.)

raises.

the

Idaho

EQ

at

Court

at

to the

about to be committed.

397.

of Appeals

156 Idaho

is

known

at

rejected

the

argument

that

615, 329 P.3d at 397 (“Perez-Jungo

argues that the extension of his detention could only be justiﬁed by reasonable suspicion
that a speciﬁc crime

have been obj ective

had been committed. In other words, he contends

facts that

that there

must

provided reasonable suspicion of at least one 0f the speciﬁc

crimes the ofﬁcer suspected Perez-Jungo 0f having committed”) (emphasis original).

Reasonable suspicion only requires a “showing of objective and speciﬁc articulable

11

facts

giving reason to believe that the individual has been 0r

is

about t0 be involved in some

criminal activity.” Li. (emphasis original).

Perez-Jungo misapprehends the applicable standard. Just as With probable
cause t0 search a vehicle, reasonable suspicion does not require a belief
that

any speciﬁc criminal

afoot t0 justify an investigative

activity is

detention; instead, all that

is

required

is

a showing of objective and

speciﬁc articulable facts giving reason t0 believe that the individual has

been 0r

is

about to be involved in some criminal

based on the

whole

totality

activity.

This analysis

of the circumstances, meaning that

picture, including those facts that

may

we

100k

is

at the

support suspicion of one

crime but not another. Even

if there is

not sufﬁcient reasonable suspicion

0f any speciﬁc crime, there

may

be reasonable suspicion that some

criminal activity

is

afoot,

still

which

is

that is required to extend

all

an

investigative detention.

Li. (internal citations omitted;

that the district court

emphasis

was required

Further, the cases relied

original).

t0 identify a speciﬁc crime, is contrary t0

upon by Whitecotton undercut

the analysis of the district court because

V.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

facts available to the

man of reasonable

392 U.S.

at

In

ofﬁcer

Tm,

In

moment of the

p.

10 (citing

The Court found

that determination the

is

that

Supreme Court asked

was appropriate?”

an ofﬁcer

no probable cause

t0

may

m,

investigate

make an

arrest.”

Court detailed the objective facts available t0

the ofﬁcer at the time he temporarily detained the suspects in that case:

[Ofﬁcer McFadden] had observed [the three men] go through a series of
acts,

Adams

seizure or search ‘Warrant

caution in the belief that the action taken

21-22 (citations omitted).

making

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief,

the United States

at the

“possibly criminal behavior even though there

Li. at 22.

argument and support

(1968); Navarette V. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014);

Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).)

Whether “the
a

1

his

Idaho law.

none of these three cases require the type 0f

speciﬁc crime identiﬁcation Whitecotton proposes.

Ter_ry V.

Whitecotton’s argument 0n appeal,

each 0f them perhaps innocent in

12

itself,

but which taken together

warranted further investigation. There

is

men

nothing unusual in two

Nor

standing together 0n a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone.

there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling

is

up

and down the street, singly 0r in pairs. Store Windows, moreover, are made
t0 be looked in. But the story is quite different Where, as here, two men
hover about a

Which

it

street corner for

becomes apparent

men

anything; Where these

an extended period of time,

that they are

window roughly 24

times;

where each

followed immediately by a conference between
0n the corner; where they are joined in one of these

completion of this route

two men

not waiting for anyone 0r

pace alternately along an identical route,

pausing to stare in the same store
the

end of

at the

conferences by a third

is

man who

men

leaves swiftly; and where the two

ﬁnally follow the third and rejoin him a couple 0f blocks away. It would
have been poor police work indeed for an ofﬁcer 0f 30 years’ experience
in the detection

of thievery from stores in

same neighborhood

this

have

t0

failed to investigate this behavior further.

Li. at 22-23.

Importantly,

when determining whether

men

McFadden

t0 detain the three

McFadden

(0r the trial court) t0 specify

t0 investigate, the

robbery, theft, or other speciﬁc crime.

at

men were

Ofﬁcer

going to commit a

The Court only noted

22-23.

ofﬁcer’s experience in the detection of thievery.

for

Court did not require Ofﬁcer

Whether the three

EQ
ﬂQ

was appropriate

it

The Court required

the

the ofﬁcer t0

articulate the speciﬁc reasons for his suspicions but not the speciﬁc crime.

The same

is

true in

Adams

V.

Williams. At 2:15

duty in a high-crime area 0f Bridgeport, Connecticut,

am.

When

Sergeant Connolly was on

a person

known

t0 Sergeant

Connolly told him that an individual in a nearby car was carrying narcotics and had a gun.

m,

407

at

144-145.

Sergeant Connolly approached the car and asked the occupant,

Robert Williams, t0 open the door.

Li.

Li. at 145.

Williams rolled the Window

down

instead.

Sergeant Connolly could not see the gun. Li. However, based upon the information

provided by the informant, Sergeant Connolly reached into the car and grabbed the gun.
Li.

The gun was Where

the informant said

it

13

would

be.

Li.

Sergeant Connolly arrested

Williams for unlawful possession 0f a gun.
quantities of heroin.

Li The United

0f the gun was constitutional.
that

ﬂQ

States

at

A

Li.

subsequent search found large

Supreme Court found

145-146. The Court reiterated the Ter_ry standard

an ofﬁcer can investigate “possibly” criminal behavior even

have probable cause for an

arrest.

that the initial seizure

Li.

The Court

“A

stated:

if the

brief stop of a suspicious

individual, in order t0 determine his identity or to maintain the status

while obtaining more information,

may be most

ofﬁcer does not

quo momentarily

reasonable in light 0f the facts

known

t0

the ofﬁcer at the time.” Li. (citations omitted).

Again, like in Telly, the Court in
speciﬁc crime

is

Adams

did not require an articulation of which

Whitecotton’s argument 0n appeal appears t0 be similar t0

suspected.

the rejected argument 0f the dissent in

Adams. The

dissent argued, in part, that Sergeant

Connolly’s actions were not justiﬁed under Ter_ry because he did not

know

if

Williams

was even committing a crime by having a gun 0r narcotics:
With respect to
had ever seen

the gun, the ofﬁcer did not
the

know

gun, 0r Whether the gun

Connecticut law permitted, 0r

illegally.

And

whether they were legally 0r

was

when

the informant

carried legally,

as

With respect to the narcotics,

know what kind 0f narcotics

the ofﬁcer did not

if or

respondent allegedly had,

what the basis 0f the
was capable of

illegally possessed,

informant’s knowledge was, 0r even Whether the informant
distinguishing narcotics from other substances.

Li. at

158-159 (Marshall,

rationale

and instead held

J.,

it

dissenting).

The majority

was reasonable

in

Adams

for an ofﬁcer t0 brieﬂy stop a suspicious

individual in order to determine his or her identify and t0 obtain

Q

at

145-146. The level 0f speciﬁcity Whitecotton argues

the case law.

14

did not accept this

is

more information.

required

is

E

not supported in

Finally, Navarette V. California does not support Whitecotton’s argument.

Navarette, the United States

t0 stop a driver

Supreme Court held

based upon an anonymous

that

In

an ofﬁcer had reasonable suspicion

caller’s report that the driver “ran the [caller]

off the roadway.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398-404. While the bulk 0f the opinion focused

0n whether the anonymous
could

rely, the

tip

had sufﬁcient

indicia of reliability

on which the police

Court did ultimately conclude that the reported driving behavior was a

signiﬁcant indicator of potential drunk driving and, thus, the ofﬁcer had reasonable

suspicion to detain the driver.

EQ

Nowhere

in the Navarette opinion does the

Court

require the detaining ofﬁcer t0 identify a speciﬁc criminal offense.

“[R]easonable suspicion does not require a belief that any speciﬁc criminal
activity is afoot t0 justify

an investigative detention; instead,

showing of objective and speciﬁc
individual has been or

156 Idaho

at

is

all that is

required

is

a

articulable facts giving reason t0 believe that the

about t0 be involved in some criminal activity.” Perez-Jungo,

615, 329 P.3d at 397 (emphasis original). Here, the district court found that

Ofﬁcer Rodgriuez, based upon the known informant’s report 0f the odd and suspicious
behavior 0f an individual With a gun strapped t0 his chest, had reasonable suspicion t0
temporarily detain Whitecotton in order to check his identiﬁcation and gather further

information.

not

(E R., pp. 91-98.)

The

district court

err.

15

applied the correct standard and did

II.

The

District

Court Did Not Abuse

When It Imposed A

Discretion

Its

Sentence Within

The Applicable Legal Limits
A.

Introduction

The
227, L.

7;

ﬂ alﬂ

made during
abused
22.)

its

imposed a

district court

R., pp. 177-179.)

On
on

the district court’s ruling

discretion

When

it

initially

district

its

his

imposed the sentence.

discretion.

Standard

there

is

224, L. 20

Tr., p.

Rule 35 motion indicates the

comment

its

—

p.

comment

district court

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-

out 0f context and does not

Further, even if the

court provided other proper reasons for

Supreme Court precedent

(m 12/15/17

appeal, Whitecotton argues that one

Whitecotton’s argument takes a single

the district court abused

B.

legal sentence.

comment was

show

erroneous, the

sentence and, thus, under Idaho

no abuse of discretion.

Of Review

Idaho appellate courts use an abuse-of—discretion standard 0f review t0 determine

Whether a sentence

is

excessive.

State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,

(2019) (citing State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

434 P.3d 209, 211

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016)). Under the

abuse-of—discretion standard the appellate Court considers “Whether the

trial court:

“(1)

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of

discretion;

(3)

acted consistently with the legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc

choices available to

Lunneborg

V.

its

it;

and

MV Fun Life,

(4)

reached

its

decision

by an

exercise of reason.” Li. (citing

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

16

Whitecotton Has Failed To

C.

Show The

Taken Out Of Context, Constituted

The jury found Whitecotton
0f Idaho Code

A

§ 18-3316.

LC.

years in state prison.

177-179.)

its

Comment,

Isolated

An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion

guilty 0f unlawful possession 0f a ﬁrearm, a Violation

Violation 0f this code section

§ 18-3316(1).

years With two years ﬁxed.

One

District Court’s

The

district court

(12/15/17 Tr., p. 224, L. 20

Thus the sentence imposed by the

—

district court

is

punishable by up to ﬁve

imposed a sentence of ﬁve

ﬂ alﬁ

227, L. 7;

p.

was within

R., pp.

the boundaries of

discretion.

When

“Generally,

‘must establish

that,

appealing a sentence as an abuse of discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View of the

facts, the

sentence

was excessive

considering the objectives of criminal punishment.” Matthews, 164 Idaho at

P.3d

at

m,

212

(citing State V. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 856,

_,

26 P.3d 31, 39 (2001);

m

99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)). “Those objectives are

434

(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility 0f rehabilitation;

“When

(citations omitted).

Court] review[s]

trial

all

court abused

and

(4)

punishment 0r retribution for wrong-doing.”

reviewing whether a sentence

“Where

excessive, [the Appellate

the facts and circumstances in the case and focus[es]

its

on whether the

discretion in ﬁxing the sentence.” Li. (citing State V. Baker, 136

Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001); State

(2000)).

is

Li.

V. Zaitseva,

135 Idaho 11, 13 P.3d 338

the district court imposes a sentence within the statutory limits, ‘the

appellant bears the burden 0f demonstrating that

(citing State V. Miller, 151

it is

a clear abuse 0f discretion.”

Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (201

1);

State V.

150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011)). “‘In deference t0 the

17

trial

Li

Windom,

judge, [the

Appellate Court] Will not substitute

minds might diffen’”
226-227 (2008)).
limits,

its

View 0f a reasonable sentence Where reasonable
146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217,

Li. (quoting State V. Stevens,

Since here the district court imposed a sentence Within the statutory

Whitecotton has the burden to show a clear abuse 0f discretion.

On

appeal, Whitecotton argues that one

denying his Rule 35 motion for leniency
discretion

When

district court

it

imposed the sentence.

is

comment made by the
proof that the

district court

district court

abused

its

When

the

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-22.)

denied Whitecotton’s Rule 35 motion, the

district court

made

the following

comments:

THE COURT:

A11 right.

Thank you.

Well, as far as the illegal sentence

concerned, the Court agrees

is

with [the prosecutor] that legality of the sentence 0n a Rule 35

is

0r not the Court exceeded

maximum

authority with regard t0 the

its

penalty that could be imposed, the

ﬁve years

maximum

Whether

penalty here could be up to

and the court imposed a tWO-year ﬁxed, three-year
indeterminate sentence, for a total 0f ﬁve years.

So

in prison,

I

really think that this is

35 because since

it’s

more 0f a plea 0f leniency under Rule

not an illegal sentence, his questions with regard t0

evidentiary hearing were decided previously, both at
pretrial

trial

and during

motions, and so the Court has to 100k at Whether or not the

defendant has shown that the sentence

is

excessive in light 0f any

new

or

additional information that has been subsequently provided to the Court in

support 0f that motion.

The Court’s reviewed
regard to his

being a —

his

— and

it’s

a pro se Rule 35 motion with

in service With the military, that

previously With the veterans in Pocatello,

I

he had volunteered

think those were primarily

intermixed with his evidentiary hearing and things like

that.

Those were

the primary things he talked about With regard to additional information,

and, in fact, that information
sentencing.

He was

in the presentence

was known

t0 the

Court

quite clear about his previous service,

at the

and

I

time of

saw

that

investigation report, and he also talked about his

volunteering With veterans in Pocatello and With their families, so that

18

when

was

something the Court did take into consideration

So

that’s really not

new

at the

time of sentencing.

information.

Looking at Whether or not further leniency with regard t0 the ﬁxed
sentence, he had previously pled guilty, and we were set for sentencing,
and then just determined in his mind that he was not going to appear for
sentencing, and so then we had t0 have him arrested, and then he withdrew
his plea, and he had his opportunity t0 go t0 trial.
Certainly had t0

withdrew

look

at

the

and required the State

that plea

two-year ﬁxed sentence

think the

I

much

case

differently

prove his

t0

think

guilt t0 a jury.

sufﬁcient

is

once he

in

I

order to

accomplish the goals 0f punishment and protection of society. The threeyear indeterminate sentence,

would hope

I

and be a productive citizen here

would be

that

he would be able to parole

in either Idaho 0r

Oregon, but

I

think that

the idea behind the rehabilitation for him.

So considering those goals 0f sentencing, I think the two-year
ﬁxed, three years indeterminate sentence was appropriate under the
circumstances. And so, based 0n that, the Court is going t0 deny the Rule
35 motion.
(4/27/18 Tr., p. 14, L. 8

—

p.

16, L.

Whitecotton focuses 0n the

18.)

statement that “Certainly had t0 100k at the case

much

differently

comment

the initial sentence the district court

constitutional right t0 a jury

trial.

(E

indicates that

discussing

Whitecotton’s

previously pled guilty, and

mind

that

arrested,

When the

district court

was punishing Whitecotton
id.)

While

punish a defendant for exercising a constitutional
the context 0f that statement.

once he withdrew that

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.

plea and required the State to prove his guilt to a jury.”

22.) Whitecotton argues that this

it is

right,

we were

Whitecotton’s argument ignores

plea,

district court

and he had his opportunity

19

“he

and then just determined

he was not going to appear for sentencing, and so then

and then he withdrew his

imposed

true that a district court cannot

and not appearing for sentencing:

set for sentencing,

17-

for exercising his

Immediately preceding that comment the

absconding

district court’s

we had
to

go to

to

was
had

in his

have him

trial.”

(E

id.)

Thus,

When

the district court subsequently

at the case differently after

comment

is

in the context

A defendant’s

comment about having

t0 100k

that

trial,

0f Whitecotton’s absconding and not appearing for sentencing.

appearance, 0r non-appearance, and actions during the course 0f a

did not abuse

its

Thus, the

did not

district court

trial

are

make an improper

discretion.

Further, even if that isolated

has held that

the

Whitecotton withdrew his guilty plea and went t0

proper considerations for sentencing.

comment and

made

comment was improper,

when determining whether

the Idaho

a district court abused

its

Supreme Court

discretion the appellate

court can sever the potentially inappropriate rationale if there are proper rationales also

expressed by the

district court.

E

State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,

214 (2019). The Idaho Supreme Court

_, 434 P.3d 209,

stated:

The rationale expressed in the district court’s statement can be severed
from its decision to award partial restitution because there is no indication
in the record that the comment was the district court’s only rationale. The
State argues that because the comment was the lone rationale voiced at the
hearing, it must be taken as the only possible rationale. But this View

comment and strips the comment of the context
was made. We decline t0 adopt such a restrictive View. Here,
the district court was not statutorily required to articulate its reasoning for
declining to award total or partial restitution for prosecution costs.
isolates the district court’s

in

Which

it

Therefore, the articulation of one reason does not erase

Li.

If the district court considered, either expressly or

factor,

then the district court did not abuse

its

discretion.

by

all others.

implicitly, at least

EQ

one proper

Here, the record reﬂects

the district court considered a multitude of proper factors including Whitecotton’s prior

criminal record,

his

prior

failure

on probation and

mitigating factors such as his volunteer work.

L. 7; 4/27/18 T11, p. 14, L. 8

— p.

16, L. 18.)

his

(E 12/15/17

absconding behavior, and
Tr., p.

224, L. 20

For example, the court reasoned:

20

—

p.

227,

Sir, I

think you’re an undue risk to be placed 0n probation, because

that

you would

and

that’s just

I

think

Violate your probation within a very short amount 0f time,
based on your history.

You absconded from
there have

Oregon. Since you were charged With a crime here,
been more charges and allegations against you. You absconded

from the court. You didn’t show up
do what you were supposed t0 d0

for sentencing.

You just really

didn’t

(12/15/17 TL, p. 225, Ls. 7-17.)

I

think you need correctional treatment based 0n the information that

have from the presentence investigation

would depreciate
caring

There

[sic]
is

think a lesser sentence
felon,

a ﬁrearm. There are rules out there that say you can’t do that.

1.)

The

imposed a sentence Within the

isolated

I

You’re a convicted

a reason for that. And, yet, you don’t follow the rules.

(12/15/17 Tr., p. 226, Ls. 4-1

it

report.

the seriousness 0f the crime.

I

district court

properly exercised

discretion

when

Whitecotton has failed t0 show an

statutory limits.

comment, taken out of context, constituted a

its

clear abuse 0f discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment of the

DATED this 7th day 0f May, 2019.
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